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Retail Market Conduct Reforms in South Africa under Twin Peaks 
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This article examines retail market regulatory reforms currently underway, as part of the 
implementation of a Twin Peaks regulatory model in South Africa. A brief account is provided 
of the history of these reforms, followed by an analysis of the normative goals put in place for 
a new market conduct and consumer protection regime; and the developmental needs that 
inform those goals. Thereafter the article explores the inter-relationship between the existing 
credit regulator and the soon to be established Financial Sector Conduct Authority. An 
analysis is then provided of accountability mechanisms, as well as failures exhibited by those 
mechanisms in the UK and Australia. Finally an argument is made for a ‘regulator for the 
regulators’, in order to address past regulatory failures. 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The ‘Twin Peaks’
1
 model of financial 
system regulation was first proposed by 
Michael Taylor in 1995.
2
 Taylor’s idea 
began as an attempt to address, principally, 
two problems evident in the United 
Kingdom: first, that the large and disparate 
number of regulators of financial products, 
services, and entities, each with its own 
limited jurisdiction, left consumers 
confused as to whom to approach for 
support. Consumers were confronted by a 
bevvy of regulators, whose acronyms 
taken together Taylor described as an 
‘alphabet soup’.
3
 To this Taylor proposed a 
dedicated, whole-of financial system 
regulator – a one-stop shop – the purpose 
of which would be to protect consumers, 
and deter market misconduct.
4
 The second 
problem Taylor identified and which he 
asserted his model could address, was that 
of a blurring of the boundaries
5
 between 
types of financial entities: banks were 
combining with insurers, merchant banks 
were combining with securities traders – 
causing gaps to appear in regulatory 
coverage.
6
 This second regulator would 
have a consolidated group-level view of all 
entities under its jurisdiction, with the 
authority to create and enforce regulations 
aimed at safeguarding financial system 
stability.
7
 
First adopted in Australia in 1997,
8
 
and subsequently followed in The 
Kingdoms of the Netherlands and 
Belgium, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and now South Africa,
9
 
which is poised to impose a ‘Twin Peaks’ 
financial regulatory architecture. The 
South African reforms shadow those of the 
1987 de Kock Commission, which 
established the ‘Financial Rand’ and the 
dual exchange rate;
10
 they are more 
significant than those of the 1993 Melamet 
Commission
11
 and, some would argue, 
more significant than any other changes to 
the management of the financial system 
since South Africa left the gold-standard in 
1932.
12
 
 
B. Twin Peaks with normative 
goals 
 
South Africa’s trek to twin peaks 
commenced in 2011 with the publication 
by the South African National Treasury of 
a policy document
13
 which provided an 
overview of the financial sector, and put 
forward overarching principles to guide 
analysis of whether, and to what extent, 
there was a need for regulatory reform. 
The process’ commencement coincided 
with the aftermath of the sub-prime 
disaster in the United States, and the 
ensuing GFC
14
, and this may be one 
explanation as to why the Cabinet, on 
approving the adoption of Twin Peaks, 
specified that one of the guiding principles 
to a new regulatory regime should be that 
the quality of supervision must be 
sufficiently intense, intrusive and 
effective.
15
 To that was added:  
Market conduct oversight must be 
sufficiently strong to complement 
prudential regulation, 
particularly in the banking sector. 
Market conduct oversight is 
critical for the financial sector, 
and complements prudential 
oversight.
16
 
This is a theme that also appears frequently 
in the Draft Market Conduct Policy 
document
17
 issued as an adjunct to 
National Treasury’s 2011 document that, if 
need be, supervision must be intrusive. 
… ordinary, generic customer 
protection laws do not go far 
enough ... potential for economic 
disruption and consumer hardship 
… sector requires much higher 
regulatory standards relative to 
other sectors … tailored to 
respond to market conduct risks. 
... A dedicated regulator for 
market conduct, the FSCA, will 
supervise financial institutions 
more intensely and intrusively … 
take steps to end unfair or 
harmful practises as they emerge, 
...
18
 
This comports with current 
thinking developed post-GFC. Carmichael, 
Foundation Chair of Australia’s prudential 
regulator and a member of the Wallis 
Commission of Inquiry whose findings led 
to the establishment of Twin Peaks in 
Australia states that prior to the GFC, 
conduct regulations were reactive not 
proactive, and focused on pursuing 
breaches of the law.
19
 He states that with a 
shift post-GFC from product disclosure to 
product suitability, conduct regulators have 
had to become more preventative in their 
approach to regulatory enforcement; and 
this is reflected in new methodologies, for 
example a greater degree of onsite 
inspections as opposed to investigations, 
where the latter typically takes place when 
there is an alleged breach.
20
 Carmichael 
states that this new approach is more 
resource intensive.
21
 If Carmichael is 
correct, then that has crucial implications 
for South Africa, a developing country 
with needs across society that are greater 
than the resources available.
22
 
These social benefit goals laid the 
basis for a dispensation which is, at least in 
terms of its stated aims, strongly normative 
– an aspect to which this article will return. 
The process envisages two pieces 
of legislation, the first of which, the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act
23
 (FSRA), 
was promulgated in August 2017. In so 
doing, South Africa becomes the first 
developing
24
 nation to adopt this model.
25
 
Other countries that have signalled an 
interest in adopting Twin Peaks include 
South Korea,
26
 Canada,
27
 Nigeria,
28
 
Kenya,
29
 and China.
30
 This forms part of a 
global trend, starting in 1998, in which 80 
per cent of OECD members have reformed 
their domestic financial regulatory 
architecture
31
 - and particularly in 
countries with sectoral or institutional 
models.
32
 It is for these reasons that the 
South African reforms are noteworthy: as 
mentioned, it is the first developing 
country and latest adopter of Twin Peaks, 
and as such may be expected to evidence 
latest thinking; lessons learned in South 
Africa will be of relevance wherever Twin 
Peaks is adopted next, but also of 
relevance wherever Twin Peaks is already 
de lege. If the conventional wisdom is 
correct, by ascribing much of Australia’s 
success during the global financial crisis 
(GFC) to the deployment of Twin Peaks,
33
 
then lessons learned in South Africa will 
have a potentially wider impact, beyond 
the specificities of Twin Peaks, by 
providing lessons for the avoidance of 
financial crises generally. To that end, 
success in South Africa may act as an 
exemplar of what solutions regulatory 
architectural design can offer to the 
overarching project: the avoidance of 
financial crises. 
The Australian banking system 
was more sheltered than a 
number of other countries and 
weathered the Global Financial 
Crisis relatively well. This was in 
part due to relative concentration 
of the system on a well 
performing domestic economy, 
but also due to a material 
contribution from a well-
developed regulatory and 
supervisory structure.
34
 
As mentioned previously, the South 
African reforms are noteworthy for another 
reason: they are grounded in a clearly 
normative approach, which specifically 
mentions the developmental priorities of 
the South African government, and 
doubtless the expectations of the 
community; in particular, the large 
percentage of South Africa’s population 
that has limited access to finance, limited 
education, limited ownership of assets, and 
suffers under a substantial disparity of 
wealth. 
With a population of 55 million,
35
 
those regarded as economically-active, and 
between the ages of 15 and 64 number 
approximately 40 million.
36
 One quarter of 
that number – what should be The 
Republic’s most economically productive 
citizens – are unemployed.
37
 While South 
Africa has made commendable 
improvements to its education system 
since the advent of democracy in 1994, 
there are still in excess of two and a half 
million adults who are illiterate.
38
 Between 
2010 and 2015, of the 143 countries that 
provided data, South Africa’s Gini 
coefficient, a measurement for wealth 
disparity, placed South Africa at 143.
39
 
Using a Palma ratio,
40
 out of 143 countries 
that reported, South Africa was 143rd.
41
 
Using a quintile ratio, out of 46 countries 
reporting, South Africa was ranked 45
th
.
42
 
Together these factors are instrumental in 
creating low levels of financial inclusion in 
South Africa. Combined with poor levels 
of financial literacy (see Fig. 1), there exist 
opportunities for unscrupulous financial 
service providers, and especially lenders, 
to take advantage of the large number of 
unsophisticated financial consumers in 
South Africa. Such an outcome would, in 
turn, impede successful financial inclusion, 
potentially cause disproportionate 
detriment to the most vulnerable in 
society,
43
 deter savings, inhibit 
intermediation, result in social unrest 
potentially causing death,
44
 and in the 
worst scenario a financial crisis (see 
below). It is no wonder, then, that the 
South African authorities have placed such 
emphasis not just on consumer protection 
and good market conduct, but further, by 
articulating goals that strongly emphasise 
societal good, with particular emphasis on 
the poor. 
… [W]e have perhaps just 
witnessed one of the most 
appalling microcredit-related 
disasters of all in South Africa. 
Extreme over-indebtedness … 
helped precipitate the Marikana 
massacre on August 16 [2012]. 
Miners … were … seduced … into 
accessing far too much 
microcredit.
45
 
… [F]orced into spending more 
on interest payments ... no matter 
how hard they tried, … not prise 
themselves away from … 
microcredit in advance of payday 
... The miners’ desperation and 
anger was palpable, Lonmin 
refused to back down, and a 
massacre ensued [when South 
African Police Services members 
shot striking miners].
46
 
 
Figure 1.
47
 
 
 
The subprime lesson 
Analyses of the lessons to be learned from 
the GFC often focus on systemic stability 
issues cum bank soundness principles and 
regulations, at the expense of the need to 
provide analysis of what is adequate 
consumer protection and the prevention of 
market misconduct. But this overlooks the 
fact that the GFC was market misconduct 
and consumer abuse write large. As Wray 
states: 
… many billions of dollars of 
fraudulent loans … by 
Countrywide[
48
]… sold 
fraudulently to Fannie and 
Freddie through false 
representations and warranties. 
… 97% of the Countrywide loans 
reviewed by Ambac … had false 
reps and warranties. Countrywide 
also engaged in widespread 
foreclosure fraud. … [E]xamined 
by a truly independent body has 
found widespread fraud — in loan 
origination, loan sales, 
appraisals, and foreclosures. … 
[O]ne financially sophisticated 
entity after another found 
widespread fraud by Countrywide 
in the entire gamut of its 
operations, the administration, 
the industry… Countrywide made 
hundreds of thousands of 
fraudulent loans … It fraudulently 
foreclosed on large numbers of 
loans. It victimized hundreds of 
thousands of people and hundreds 
of financial institutions, causing 
hundreds of billions of dollars of 
losses. It has defrauded more 
people, at a greater cost, than any 
entity in history ... The financial 
media treats Bank of America as 
if it were a legitimate bank rather 
than a “vector” spreading the 
mortgage fraud epidemic 
throughout much of the Western 
world.
49
 
And even more troubling than the 
countless instances of fraud and 
misconduct that gave rise to the subprime 
crisis – troubling enough as those were – 
were the nasty, predatory, and at times 
racist
50
 undertones of so many of those 
malpractices. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the South African authorities, 
cognoscente of the country’s 
developmental needs and society’s 
aspirations, and aware that the poor and ill-
educated, who constitute the majority of 
the population, suffer disproportionate 
harm in poorly regulated markets; that 
where such harmful practices remain 
unchallenged, systemic threats to the entire 
financial system may result. 
 
The 2014 National Treasury Draft 
Market Conduct Policy 
Released as a Discussion Document, the 
Draft Market Conduct Policy makes clear 
the following view (albeit not in so many 
words):  
… constantly remind market 
participants that finance only 
exists to serve the broader 
community and the economy.
51
 
Not the other way round. 
The Report states in its first 
paragraph that consumers are inadequately 
protected in South Africa;
52
 that they fall 
prey to reckless lending ‘paired with 
disgraceful (and illegal) debt-collection 
practices’; that poor market conduct 
prejudicial to consumers exacerbates 
problems of low domestic savings and 
high levels of over indebtedness; and that 
these and other factors impede South 
Africa progressing towards greater levels 
of financial inclusion.
53
 As such the Report 
tacitly acknowledges that the management 
of the financial system must be focused, at 
least in part, on redressing the injustices 
and in particular the income inequality that 
was the result of 46 years of Apartheid. 
… financial inclusion [is defined] 
as the broadening and deepening 
of the access to, usage of, and 
quality of financial 
products/services to all adults 
particularly the marginalised 
groups such as the un-served and 
under-served.
54
 
One of the advantages of the Twin 
Peaks model is its separation of 
prudential/system stability oversight from 
that of market conduct and consumer 
protection, with particular care taken to 
ensure that one peak does not dominate the 
other. In that respect Twin Peaks 
accommodates an ideational principle: that 
consumer protection and prudential 
regulation should be regarded as equal, and 
that the ensuing policy disagreements and 
conflicting situational responses should be 
regarded as a natural phenomenon, 
embraced, and settled through discussions 
convened at an over-arching council, 
underpinned by constant and close 
communication and cooperation.
55
  
Market conduct regulation aims 
to better protect financial 
customers by responding to these 
risks, and is a key pillar of the 
Twin Peaks system being 
implemented in South Africa.
56
 
This principle is borne out in the 
Treasury’s clear view that: 
Protecting customers and 
ensuring they are treated fairly by 
financial institutions is the 
essence of market conduct policy 
and law.
57
 
 
C. Three Peaks? 
 
This confident exposition of what the 
consumer protection peak should be 
focused upon, without the barest mention 
of systemic stability issues is, ideationally 
at least, the essence of where consumer 
protection should be located: an end in 
itself. How successful this will be in 
practice remains to be seen. However, 
there is evidence to date that the South 
African authorities understand that 
consumer protection is its own very 
distinct territory, and one that needs to be 
defended from incursion.
58
 In defence of 
its realm the proposed consumer protection 
peak, the Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority (FSCA), will be buttressed by an 
already existing consumer credit protection 
regime: a dedicated National Credit 
Regulator (NCR),
59
 created by the 
National Credit Act of 2005,
60
 and 
complimented by a National Credit 
Tribunal.
61
  
It is not unusual to find a separation 
between the protection of consumers of 
credit and those of consumers of other 
financial products and services. Such a 
bifurcation exists in Australia as well, in 
the form of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) – the 
agency with general responsibility for 
consumer protection in the financial 
industry - and the National Credit Code,
62
 
and the Credit and Investments 
Ombudsman.
63
 However the South African 
regime is distinct from Australia’s in a 
number of crucial respects, and it is the 
degree of difference that is potentially 
significant: the Australian Ombud is 
created pursuant to powers vested in ASIC, 
and must be approved by ASIC from time 
to time to remain functioning,
64
 whereas 
the NCR does not exist at the pleasure of 
the FSCA, is a national government 
agency, created by statute,
65
 with powers 
and prerogatives at law. The Australian 
Ombud may have regard to equity and the 
law as laid down in the Code, but despite 
that flexibility, it may be argued that the 
South African arrangement is preferable, 
because the legislation that it is built 
around is more consumer centric than 
Australian’s.
66
 Moreover, the role of the 
South African NCR is considerably more 
comprehensive: it licenses extenders of 
credit; its powers are not limited to 
mediation, but extend to litigation, 
including litigation where the complainant 
is the NCR, and not an individual 
consumer; is imbued with social upliftment 
and financial inclusion priorities; is 
required to research trends in credit 
extension and make those findings known; 
is required to contribute to financial 
literacy education; is expected to make a 
contribution to policy, including legislative 
reform proposals; regulates and adjudicates 
in certain administrative manners; and 
hands down findings in respect of 
compliance.
67
 
As a result, and because the South 
African legislation was drafted with 
bespoke provisions for monitoring, 
regulating, licensing, educating, enforcing 
and at times punishing, within one 
statutorily empowered agency, it provides 
a regime in which the South African credit 
regulator is a far more sophisticated and 
entrenched agency than the equivalent 
arrangement in Australia. The question 
then arises as to whether two regulators, 
both with an interest in, and powers over, 
what is essentially the same territory, was 
the best solution? Or whether it would 
have been better to have housed these 
functions within the FSCA?
68
 The simple 
answer is that the current arrangement is a 
product of history: the National Credit 
Regulator was created in 2005,
69
 whereas 
the FSCA was not contemplated until 
2011.
70
 That said, there are arguments to 
be made in support of the South African 
arrangement: 
i) The regulator’s roles: if the 
Australian experience proves 
instructive,
71
 then the consumer 
protection peak (FSCA) will 
take a macro-prudential view, 
while the NCR will continue to 
fulfil a micro-prudential role. 
This plugs a gap between 
regulator’s interventions that 
are in the country’s best 
interests (macro-prudential), 
but where the regulator declines 
to act, even in the best interests 
of individual consumers 
because their particular plight is 
inadequately wide-spread, 
versus (micro-prudential) 
interventions on behalf of 
consumers whose plight, whilst 
not wide-spread, is nonetheless 
urgent for them; 
ii) Credit, a good servant but a 
bad master: credit by its nature 
can be seductive. When 
extended recklessly, excessive 
credit can trap borrowers in an 
inescapable cycle of 
indebtedness and poverty.
72
 
Notwithstanding the 
acknowledgement of the 
dangers improperly regulated 
credit can pose, and the 
persistent problem of over-
indebtedness among South 
African households, and despite 
the work of the NCR since its 
establishment, the problem 
persists: unsecured loans in 
South Africa have become the 
biggest growth market for the 
four major South African 
banks.
73
 The problems 
associated with credit are, 
therefore, on-going and severe. 
amount of credit granted to 
consumers has increased 
substantially from R1.1 trillion in 
2007 to R1.5 trillion in 2014. 
There were 21.7 million credit 
active consumers and out of these, 
9.6 million (44.2%) had impaired 
records. This increase has also 
led to an evolution of the problem 
of household over-indebtedness. 
Household debt to disposable 
income in South Africa is still 
high, even though the overall 
household indebtedness is 
actually down from its early 
peaks: Q4 2008 — 81.9% and this 
fell to 74.3% in Q4 2013. This is 
an indication that a large portion 
of household incomes still goes to 
servicing debt.
74
 
iii) South Africa’s demographics: 
the combination of poor,
75
 ill-
educated,
76
 already over-
indebted, financially ill-
educated or illiterate 
consumers, whose needs are not 
currently being met, results in a 
portion of the population who 
are both vulnerable and in need 
of a path to greater financial 
inclusion. In combination with 
the nature and effects of credit, 
the need for protection aimed at 
vulnerable consumers in their 
consumption of credit becomes 
more obvious; 
iv) South Africa’s history: South 
Africans of colour were not 
only politically disenfranchised 
by Apartheid, they were 
economically dispossessed as 
well. Credit extension is an 
important stage in the path to 
financial inclusion. If a 
dedicated credit regulator can 
better serve the goal of 
financial inclusion, then that 
advantage may exceed the 
disadvantage created by a 
bifurcation of consumer 
protection regulators; 
v) Economies of scale: the 
majority of South Africans are 
classified as poor.
77
 If 
sufficiently wide-spread, 
unscrupulous credit extension 
that preys upon the vulnerable 
in society has, therefore, the 
capacity to be a systemic threat; 
Consumer financial protection 
can, and must, serve a role not 
only in protecting individuals 
from excessive risk, but also in 
protecting markets from systemic 
risk. Economic studies indicate it 
is not merely high rates of 
defaults on consumer loans, but 
highly correlated defaults that 
create risks for lenders and 
investors in asset-backed 
securities.
78
 
vi) Focus: a dedicated regulator 
with oversight over smaller 
territory – credit – may be able 
to bring more focus to the task, 
develop a greater degree of 
expertise specific to the 
regulation of credit, and 
develop a corporate culture 
more suited to its task (for 
example, by developing its 
frontline capacity to assist 
members of the public), than 
would a generalist consumer 
protection peak that operates 
also with a credit regulatory 
role. 
So, while Twin Peaks jurisdictions 
such as Australia have carved out a 
separate set of structures for dealing with 
problems associated with the extension of 
credit, the South African arrangement is, 
by comparison, both more sophisticated 
and complex. The degree of difference 
between the two dedicated credit regimes 
is sufficient to present the South African 
Twin Peaks model with additional 
challenges: the NCR is a fully-fledged 
agency, and relationships with the two 
peaks will have to be managed with the 
same care, deference and cooperative spirit 
with which the relationship between the 
two peaks will have to be managed. 
Consequently, success will depend upon 
the degree to which these two entities – the 
FSCA and the NCR – coordinate, 
communicate and cooperate. In particular, 
there are areas where the NCA and the 
FSCA will overlap: where credit is 
bundled with other types of accounts, both 
regulators would be involved. Without 
close coordination this could lead to 
confusion and contradiction. 
To that end the Financial Sector 
Regulation Act
79
 includes specific 
provisions for the establishment and 
maintenance of the relationship between 
the regulators,
80
 including membership the 
Financial Stability Oversight Committee.
81
 
The Act specifically designates the NCR 
as a ‘financial sector regulator’ in the same 
definition in which it designates the FSCA 
and the prudential authority as financial 
sector regulators.
82
 The Act quarantines 
financial products that involve the 
provision of credit
83
 to the National Credit 
Act,
84
 save for specific provisions in the 
FSRA set aside for the jurisdiction of the 
FSCA.
85
 
Over and above these legislative 
provisions that require cooperation and 
communication, an essential mechanism 
by which the performance of the South 
African peaks will be measured will rest 
upon regulator accountability. In respect of 
market conduct, that accountability may be 
measured against some or all of the 
normative standards expressed in the 
legislation, policy documents and 
government policy.
86
 
 
D. Regulator Accountability 
 
It appears intuitive that accountability be 
regarded as an indispensible component of 
effective government, and this extends to 
regulator efficacy.
87
 In Australia formal 
accountability takes the form of annual 
reports
88
 and Parliamentary oversight.
89
 
There exists also the possibility of 
oversight by independent bodies, and of 
course by the public through the media.
90
 
A similar regime will exist in South 
Africa, where the prudential regulator will 
be required to submit annual reports to the 
National Assembly.
91
 The FSCA must also 
produce and submit annual reports via the 
Auditor General.
92
 All the regulators of the 
financial system plus the Reserve Bank are 
members of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Committee, which includes an 
accountability regime,
93
 as well as the 
Financial System Council of Regulators, 
which provides for extensive government 
oversight.
94
 This comports with what 
Taylor envisaged for the model through 
either Ministerial or Parliamentary 
oversight.
95
  
That said, Parliamentary and 
Ministerial oversight and the production of 
annual reports failed dismally in the UK 
prior to the GFC. 
… the FSA was not so much the 
dog that did not bark as a dog 
barking up the wrong tree. … 
contributed to the appalling 
supervisory neglect of asset 
quality. The FSA’s attempts to 
raise concerns on these other 
fronts from late 2007 onwards 
proved to be a case of too little, 
too late
96
 … The regulatory 
approach encouraged a focus on 
box-ticking which detracted from 
consideration of the fundamental 
issues with the potential to bring 
the bank down. The FSA’s 
approach also encouraged the 
Board of HBOS to believe that 
they could treat the regulator as a 
source of interference to be 
pushed back, rather than an 
independent source of guidance 
and, latterly, a necessary 
constraint upon the company’s 
mistaken courses of action.
97
 
In his foreword to the FSA report 
on the ruinous RBS-ABN Amro takeover, 
Lord Turner, FSA Chairman, stated that 
RBS had procured two lever-arch folders 
and a CD
98
 as the sum total of their due 
diligence, to which Hosking responded: 
His suggestion is clear: if only 
RBS had garnered more 
information, if only there had 
been more lever-arch files... This 
is the philosophy of the deluded 
bureaucrat. If only there had been 
more reports, more meetings; if 
only more boxes had been ticked, 
more forms filled in. On the 
Origin of Species, the Bible and 
the collected works of 
Shakespeare could be contained 
in two lever-arch folders and a 
CD. How much more information 
does Lord Turner think RBS 
needed? … It’s not volume of 
information that matters. It’s 
quality.
99
 
Hosking points out that in respect 
of the claim that in the three and a half 
years prior to RBS’s collapse, the FSA met 
with RBS 511 times:
100
  
It’s typical that there is someone 
to count them, but no one to 
explain what on earth went on in 
them ... would [it] have been 
better had there been a thousand? 
The FSA tells us that 0.5 of an 
FSA manager and 4.5 team 
members were assigned to RBS as 
it was mounting the bid.
101
 The 
clipboard-hugging precision of 
those decimals speaks volumes … 
The report is a blizzard of 
acronyms and bogus science: RBS 
was scored as a “medium high 
minus”
102
 risk, whatever that is 
…
103
 
Similarly in Australia the 
performance of the regulators has been 
patchy at times, and deeply inadequate at 
others.
104
 The litany of scandals that have 
infected Australia’s banking, insurance, 
and financial advice industries has led to 
consistent calls for a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into the conduct of Australia’s 
banks, and the oversight conducted by the 
regulators.
105
 
As Barth et al assert, regulators 
prior to the GFC abrogated their 
responsibilities, and giving them more 
regulatory power will not address this 
problem.
106
 
 
E. A regulator for the regulators 
 
Unfortunately, in the wake of the 
crisis, we now seem to be lurching 
from one simplistic, unqualified 
ideology—that private markets 
will look after society’s 
interests—to an equally flawed, if 
not more perilous, ideology—that 
the Guardians will always act in 
society’s interests, so let’s give 
them more power to do so.
107
 
Successful and lasting reform 
requires addressing a core cause 
of the systemic malfunctioning of 
financial systems—poor 
governance of the Guardians of 
Finance.
108
 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that 
Australia’s Financial System Inquiry 
recommended a ‘regulator for the 
regulators’ in the form of a Financial 
Regulator Assessment Board (FRAB),
109
 
which would replace the Financial Sector 
Advisory Council (FSAC), and would 
undertake ex post reviews of regulator 
accountability
110
 by ‘assess[ing] how 
regulators have used the powers and 
discretions available to them.’
111
 As may 
have been expected, the Australian 
regulators pushed back against this idea.
112
 
Such a Board could be expected 
not only to assess and evaluate regulatory 
action and outcomes, but to delve into 
regulatory culture as well. As McConnell 
states: 
In behavioural economics, such 
“concurrence” across a group is 
called groupthink. … Groupthink 
… is unhealthy because, not only 
do people start to think alike, it is 
only a short step to believing 
people who are singing a different 
tune should be excluded and 
thrown out of the chorus. Dissent 
can be destructive, but the role of 
the Devil’s Advocate is well-
understood to be valuable, 
drawing out important questions 
people would rather not answer. 
… [the FRAB would comprise of] 
knowledgeable experts, crucially 
not tied to regulators, with a 
diverse membership that would 
“act as a safeguard against the 
FRAB being unduly influenced by 
the views of one particular group 
or industry sector”.
113
 
An oversight board would be less 
likely to be captured by the prevailing 
culture within the entities which it would 
oversee, and that would include identifying 
instances of regulatory capture generally. 
… according to considerable 
evidence from around the world, 
financial regulation is 
systematically biased in favor of 
the financial services industry and 
against the interests of the 
broader public.
114
 
 At the very least such a board 
would act as a sober second thought on 
issues that may have been overlooked by 
the regulator, and which may potentially 
constitute a threat to the financial 
system.
115
 
The Australian proposal has 
precedent in the UK, which established a 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC),
116
 
whose purpose is to look for the roots of 
the next crisis.
117
 It is charged with 
identifying, monitoring, and taking action 
to reduce systemic risks. 
Similarly, and in response to 
regulator’s failures prior to the GFC, Barth 
et al put forward a similar proposal for an 
expert panel of oversight, called a 
‘Senitnel’.
118
 
Unfortunately the proposal for a 
Financial Regulator Assessment Board 
was rejected by the Australian 
government.
119
 Nonetheless, the proposal 
has advantages which may be of benefit to 
the South African financial regulatory 
landscape. 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
South Africa is well-advanced in its trek 
towards Twin Peaks. The next major 
hurdle will be the creation and 
implementation of a new market conduct 
and consumer protection peak. It is no 
doubt gratifying for the majority of South 
Africans to know that this new regime will 
be, ideationally at least, firmly rooted in 
normative principles aimed at addressing 
the urgent developmental needs of The 
Republic. 
One particular aspect that will 
require attention, and no doubt generate 
analysis, is the relationship between the 
two official peaks – the prudential 
regulator and the FSCA – and what may be 
regarded as the third peak, the NCR. 
But more important still will be the 
efficacy of the regulators in discharging 
their obligations.
120
 That will, to a large 
degree, depend upon the depth and extent 
to which regulators are held accountable. 
Methodologies currently employed to 
effect accountability – via Parliamentary 
and Ministerial oversight – have recorded 
notable failures, both in times of crisis (as 
was the case in the UK), and in times of 
stability (as is the case in Australia). While 
the failures in the UK did not take place 
under a Twin Peaks regime, but took place 
prior to the introduction of Twin Peaks, the 
lesson remains the same: annual reports, 
and Parliamentary and Ministerial 
oversight may prove inadequate to the 
task. A system designed to impose ‘double 
redundancy’, or a fail-safe, may prove to 
be the solution. In light of the 
consequences of large-scale market 
misconduct cum financial crises, this 
article argues that despite the costs and 
effort involved in establishing a ‘regulator 
for the regulators’, such a proposal should 
be seriously considered for addition to the 
South African reforms. 
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